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Abstract: This study attempts to apply Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to 
improve the safety of a production system, specifically the production process of an oil company. 
Since food processing is a worldwide issue and self-management of a food company is more 
important than relying on government regulations, therefore this study focused on that matter. 
The initial step of this study is to identify and analyze the criticality of the potential failure 
modes of the production process. Furthermore, take corrective action to minimize the probability 
of repeating the same failure mode, followed by a re-analysis of its criticality. The results of 
corrective actions were compared with those before improvement conditions by testing the 
significance of the difference using two sample t-test. The final measured result is the Criticality 
Priority Number (CPN), which refers to the severity category of the failure mode and the 
probability of occurrence of the same failure mode. The recommended actions proposed by the 
FMECA significantly reduce the CPN compared with the value before improvement, with 
increases of 38.46% for the palm olein case study. 
 
Keywords: Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA); Criticality Priority Number 
(CPN); severity and occurrence classification; palm olein; potential failure mode and effect. 
  
 
Introduction 
 
Food processing is a very important worldwide issue. 
The processing may have either beneficial or 
detrimental effects on the various properties of food, 
so each of these factors must be taken into account in 
the design and preparation of complementary foods. 
Food quality is frequently associated with food 
safety. Food safety encompasses a whole series of 
processes and activities both within and outside the 
food processing plant that will ensure that the food is 
free of potential chemical, physical, and biological 
hazards. Quality within a food processing plant may 
also be related to the notion of quality control. In this 
regard, quality control has many objectives within a 
food processing plant, mainly to maintain the 
nutritional value of the processed product, to protect 
customers from the dangers of contaminated food 
and associated food borne diseases, and to ensure 
that all food laws and regulations are met. 
 
Recently, the quality assessment of processed food 
has become an emerging issue. The quality factor 
has broadened and covers all of the aspects intended 
to satisfy consumer expectations. The terms “food 
quality” and “food safety” mean different things to 
different people. 
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Quality has a vast number of meanings and can 
encompass subjects as diverse as organoleptic 
characteristic, physical and functional properties, 
nutrient content, and consumer protection from 
fraud (Malik, et al. [1]). Safety is more straight-
forward, relating to the content of various chemical 
and microbiological elements in food (Burlingame 
and Pineiro [2]). Clearly, food quality and safety 
issues need to be addressed throughout the entire 
food chain. 
 
Food safety is the responsibility of everyone involved 
with the food chain from regulators to producers to 
consumers. A modern food safety system, with the 
new risk analysis approach has the ability to more 
finely diagnose the problems and to suggest focused 
interventions to properly address them. 
 
A number of developing countries are already taking 
steps to improve and strengthen their systems for 
food safety management. Several are moving away 
from the traditional approach focused on end-
product control toward a process and science-based 
approach. Malik, et al. [1] provided one example of 
science-based activities using risk assessment to 
support food safety regulations. A science-based 
approach enhances the ability of food safety 
regulators to estimate the likelihood and magnitude 
of the resulting risks and impact on human health. 
 
In contrast, there are many cases dealing with 
violations of the objectives of quality control, espe-
cially in the case of protecting customers from the 
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dangers of contaminated food. One recent case that 
occurred in Taiwan within the last three years is a 
food scandal involving edible oils reported by Yage 
[3]. Regarding to Taiwan‟s olive oil case, South China 
Morning Post on November, 05th 2013 by Chung [4] 
reported that more than 3,000 consumers have 
applied to join a class-action lawsuit over the 
adulterated products. This issue is definitely a 
worldwide problem because it is related to damaging 
the trust in an entire industry trying to rebuild its 
reputation. Besides that, the objective of quality 
control within a food processing plant, to protect 
customers from the dangers of contaminated food 
has lost. Further, the effects of the case are not only 
local, but also spread around the world because of 
trade and import and export matters.  
 
The objectives of this study are described as follows. 
(1) Identify and analyze the criticality of the 
potential failure mode of a system, especially of the 
production process of palm olein. (2) Take corrective 
actions to minimize the probability of repeating the 
same failure mode and to re-analyze its criticality. 
(3) Compare and test the significance of the 
difference between the conditions before and after 
improvement. 
 
The final result is a criticality priority number, 
which contains a severity category and the 
probability of occurrence of the failure mode. All of 
the objectives of this study are met through an 
application of the industrial engineering tool called 
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis 
 
Methods 
 
Failure mode effects and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) 
 
The safety analysis tool called Failure Mode Effects 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a visibility tool 
that can easily be understood and used to detect the 
possible critical points (failures) of the analyzed 
system. It is useful in design comparison. FMECA 
follows a bottom-up approach. It breaks down any 
system (product and/or production process) into its 
fundamental components to detect all potential 
failure modes and their effects. Muralidharan [5] 
explained some major benefits derived from a 
properly implemented FMEA effort are as follows: 
(1) It provides a documented method for selecting a 
design with a high probability of successful operation 
and safety. (2) A documented uniform method of 
assessing potential failure mechanisms, failure 
modes and their impact on system operation, 
resulting in a list of failure modes ranked according 
to the seriousness of their system impact and 
likelihood of occurrence. (3) Early identification of 
Single Failure Points (SFPS) and system interface 
problems, which may be critical to mission success 
and/or safety. It also provides a method of verifying 
that switching between redundant elements is not 
jeopardized by postulated single failures. (4) An 
effective method for evaluating the effect of proposed 
changes in the design and/or operational procedures 
on the mission‟s success and safety. (5) A basis for in-
flight troubleshooting procedures and for locating 
performance monitoring and fault-detection devices. 
(6) Criteria for early planning of tests. 
 
FMECA involves two sub-analyses: Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Criticality 
Analysis (CA). FMEA is used to identify the main 
causes of loss of effectiveness or efficiency. Some 
types of information provided by the FMEA are the 
critical process and sub-processes as well as their 
functional identification and the potential failure 
mode and potential effect of failure for each sub-
process. CA is a tool to improve reliability and 
manage failures based on risk instead of perception. 
The criticality number technique is used mostly in 
the chemical industries and some other industries, 
Braglia [6]. The criticality number calculation is 
described in US MIL-STD-1629A [7]: Procedures for 
performing a failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis. The procedure consists of determining the 
failure-effect probability (β), the failure mode ratio 
(α), the part failure rate (λp) and its operating time (t) 
and then using these values to compute a failure 
mode Criticality Number (CN) for each failure mode. 
The failure mode ratio may be taken from a 
database source such as Failure Mode/Mechanism 
Distributions (FMD-91) authored by Chandler, et al. 
[8]. By identifying the characteristics that make each 
failure critical, the analysis will also provide valuable 
information for deciding what actions will reduce the 
risk for all failures. Bertolini, et al. [9] stated that 
there is much information can be obtained from an 
FMECA: (1) The subsystems and final items of the 
system in a hierarchical arrangement. (2) Any 
failure or generic malfunctioning, with a list and 
description of all potential failure modes for the 
process/product being analyzed. (3) The probability, 
severity, and detection ability of each failure mode‟s 
occurrence. (4) The criticality analysis, which ranks 
all failure modes in order of importance. 
 
The criticality assessment to assess the risk involved 
in each failure mode previously recognized in the 
FMEA analysis has been performed by either 
developing a Risk Priority Number (RPN) or by 
calculating an item criticality number. The RPN 
method is preferred by those in the manufacturing 
industries such as automotive companies (Ford [10]). 
Domestic appliance firms and tire companies also 
applied the RPN method, discussed by Zanussi [11] 
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and Pirelli [12], respectively. There are two 
approaches to using the RPN method: the 
quantitative (number) approach and the qualitative 
(code) approach. In the quantitative approach, the 
RPN method is based on only three factors: 
occurrence, severity, and detection. The other 
approach to using the RPN method, the qualitative 
approach, utilizes codes instead of the numbers used 
in the quantitative approach. 
 
There are some drawbacks to using the RPN 
method. It is based on a simple multiplication of the 
factors‟ scores, which is a debatable method. For 
example, it is not certain that all designers in every 
situation want to assign the same importance 
(weight) to each criterion. This situation may need a 
subjective assessment. Bowles [13] explained the 
detection ranking in the RPN approach - a measure 
of whether subsequent testing will show the failure 
mode exists rather than whether the failure will be 
detected when it occurs - should be dropped.  
 
There are some findings related to FMECA. 
Bertolini, et al. [9] reported an application of the 
method in a pasta production plant. The results 
obtained through the application of the proposed 
method to the specific case study of a durum wheat 
pasta production process demonstrate that the 
application of FMECA to the analysis of the internal 
traceability systems of food processing companies 
can yield valuable results. A valuable safety analysis 
tool should be efficiently used to analyze, improve 
and, if necessary, re-engineer a food product‟s 
internal traceability system. Braglia [6] noted that if 
reliable quantitative judgments are available for 
some criteria, they can easily be included in an 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) analysis. This 
possibility means that Multi-attribute Failure Mode 
Analysis (MAFMA) can eventually easily be 
integrated with or replace previously executed 
FMECA studies.  
 
The extension of FMECA using fuzzy logic was 
performed by Bowles and Pelaez [14]. Fuzzy logic 
provides a tool that can be used throughout the 
design process for performing a criticality analysis on 
a system design and prioritizing the failures 
identified in a FMECA for corrective actions. The 
result allows the prioritization of appropriate actions 
for correcting or mitigating the effects of a failure. 
Bowles [13] also included some comments regarding 
use of the RPN methodology. The fundamental 
problem is that ordinal scales are used to rank the 
failure modes in terms of severity, occurrence, and 
detection, but the scales are treated as if numerical 
operations on them, most notably multiplication, are 
meaningful. Bowles [13] stated that if a cost could be 
associated with each failure effect, the failures could 
be placed on a dollar scale (a ratio scale). An 
“expected cost” of the failure could be produced by 
multiplying the cost of the failure effect by the 
probability of occurrence of the underlying failure 
mode. Finally, proposed design changes could then 
be evaluated by considering their effects on the 
expected cost 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Case study: Application of FMECA to the palm 
olein production process 
 
An oil company produces palm olein as its main 
product. All of the data in this study, including the 
production process of palm olein and the numbers 
that are determined in criticality analysis portion of 
the FMECA, are obtained from direct observation on 
the production floor, measured as accurately as 
possible, followed by consulting with company‟s 
process engineer regarding the observations. First, 
the production process of palm olein is described. 
 
Production process of palm olein 
 
Figure 1 depicts the production process flow of palm 
olein, starting with Crude Palm Oil (CPO) as the 
raw material, which goes directly into the refinery 
process. The additional sub-process in the refinery 
process, which is fractionating, is performed after the 
deodorizing process is finished. To be specific, the 
refinery process consists of the degumming, 
bleaching, filtrating, deodorizing, and fractionating 
sub-processes. 
 
The CPO raw material goes into the degumming 
process, which is the first sub-process of the refinery 
process. The degumming process removes the small 
amount of gum contained in the CPO. Next, the 
company uses a chemical in the bleaching process is 
to change the colour of the oil from red-orange, like 
CPO, to clear, giving it the good appearance of palm 
olein. After the bleaching process, the CPO goes into 
the filtrating process, which filters out the residue 
that resulted from the previous process. The residue 
is filtered using a mesh. The next sub-process of the 
refinery process is deodorizing. In this process, the oil 
odour and moisture are removed using a deodorizing 
material added to the mixture. The purpose of the 
additional fractionating sub-process is to separate 
the final product into palm olein and stearin. There 
are three materials output by the fractionating 
process: palm olein, stearin, and Palm Fatty Acid 
Distillate (PFAD). Stearin is the solid fraction of 
palm olein that is produced by partial crystallization 
at a controlled temperature. Lim [0] explained that 
stearin is a useful source of natural hard vegetable 
fat for food applications. The difference between 
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palm olein and stearin is that palm olein is the liquid 
fraction, whereas stearin is the solid fraction. PFAD 
is made by refining crude palm olein. It is used in 
many industries such as the soap and animal food 
industries, and is also used as - a raw material in the 
bio-diesel and chemical industries. The palm olein 
continues to the storing process, in which it is placed 
into bottles and stored away from light and airflow. 
 
FMEA Description  
 
From Fig. 1, which depicts the production process of 
palm olein, there are many sub-processes, from 
degumming the Crude Palm Oil (CPO) raw material 
to fractionating in refinery process. The following 
discusses the critical processes detected, of which the 
company should take note. The description of each 
critical process includes its function, potential failure 
mode, and the potential effect of the failure.  
 
Among the five sub-processes on refinery process, 
the following three sub-processes are indicated as 
having potential failures: bleaching, filtrating, and 
deodorizing. In the bleaching process, the addition of 
the chemical has a potential failure mode that leads 
to an inappropriate amount being used (1.10). If too 
much chemical is added, it will affect the oil taste, 
whereas if too little to added, the oil remains red-
orange, like CPO, and it should be reprocessed to 
obtain the appropriate palm olein colour. In the 
filtrating process, a failure such as the mesh being 
full of residue (1.20) can occur if there is no schedule 
to change it. If that happens, it may cause a large 
amount of oil to be stopped at the mesh, and, of 
course, it would decrease the CPO yield. The 
deodorizing material used in the deodorizing process 
must be of the appropriate amount as was required 
for the chemical in the bleaching process. Similar to 
the amount of chemical in the bleaching process, an 
inappropriate amount of deodorizing material (1.30) 
may lead to a failure mode of the deodorizing 
process.  
 
In the storing process, the potential failure mode is 
that the bottle may be placed carelessly (2.10), not in 
the right place, so that early oxidation can occurred. 
If oxidation occurs, it may decrease the shelf life. 
 
CA Description 
 
After determining the critical process in the 
manufacture of palm olein, the criticality of each 
potential failure is analyzed. There are two appro-
aches for analyzing the criticality of potential 
failures: the quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
In the quantitative approach, there are four inde-
pendent factors. Those are failure effect probability 
(β), failure mode ratio (α), failure rate (λp), and 
operating time (t), are assigned for each potential 
failure. The final failure mode (Cm) is obtained by 
multiplying those four factors. The failure effect 
probability will be assigned a total value of 1 for each 
potential failure mode. In the case of a potential 
failure having two potential effects, each potential 
effect will be weighted according to the impact of 
failure. Each weight value comes from the analyst‟s 
judgment based on the number of complaints from 
customer to marketing within one year, and is also 
based on observational data obtained from the 
process engineer. For example, deodorizing material 
is not of the appropriate quantity may cause two 
effects. The first effect is a deterioration of the oil 
(change of the taste and a decrease of the shelf life), 
while the second effect is related to the taste of the 
deodorizing material. Based on historical data 
recorded by the company, there are a total of 7 
records of defects, with 4 complaints from customers 
can smell the oil odour and 3 from customers having 
to do with deodorized substance flavour. According to 
that data for the two effects, the failure effect 
probability assigned for the first effect is 0.571, and 
for second effect, it is 0.429, as the sum of the 
potential failure effects must be 1. 
 
The failure mode ratio has scoring similar to that of 
the failure effect probability and must also be 
assigned a total value of 1, but summed over the 
modes in each process rather than over the effects. 
The ratio is taken from a standard called Failure 
Mode/Mechanism Distributions (FMD-91) authored 
by Chandler, et al. [8]. For example, the refinery 
process consists of three sub-processes: bleaching, 
filtrating, and deodorizing. Bleaching itself has 
potential failure mode chemical substance is not of 
the appropriate quantity, with failure mode ratio 
0.39. Filtrating has potential failure mode mesh is 
already full of residue, with failure mode ratio 0.22, 
which value comes from no output of a device in 
FMD-91 standard. Deodorizing process has similar 
potential failure mode with bleaching process, that is 
deodorizing material is not of the appropriate 
quantity, and its failure mode ratio is 0.39. In total, 
the sum of the failure mode ratios of all three 
potential failure modes in the refinery process is 
equal to 1.  
 
The failure rate should be the most noticeable factor 
because it is determined by how often a potential 
failure mode might happen during the process. 
Failure can be described as waste or defective 
product. For instance, the potential failure mode of 
inappropriate deodorizing material quantity has 
failure rate of 2*10-2 failures per million hours. This 
number is obtained from 8 hours of observation, 
during which the number of deodorizing material 
usage 300 times, but of that time, 6 times is not of 
the appropriate quantity, whether it is too much or 
little, can be treated as the failure rate.  
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The last factor that determines the final failure 
mode is the operating time, which represents the 
time taken for doing the observation to obtain the 
failure rate. In this case study, the total observation 
time is 8 hours. Normally, this factor is expressed in 
seconds, and in this case, it is 28800 seconds. After 
determining the failure effect probability, failure 
mode ratio, failure rate, and operating time, these 
four factors are multiplied together to generate a 
new value called the final failure mode. In 
calculating the final failure mode for a failure effect 
probability that is divided between two effects, first 
the failure effect probabilities are added up to 1, and 
then multiplied with the other factors, so the failure 
mode only has one value for its potential failure 
mode. For example, the potential failure mode 
„deodorizing material is not of the appropriate 
quantity‟ has a first effect of deterioration of the oil 
with a failure effect probability of 0.571 and a second 
effect on the deodorizing material‟s taste with a 
failure effect probability of 0.429; these are first 
added to give 1, which is then multiplied by the 
failure mode ratio of 0.39, failure rate of 2*10-2 
failures per million hours, and an operating time of 
28800 seconds to yield a final failure mode equal to 
2.25*10-4. Details of the failure effect probability, 
failure mode ratio, failure rate, operating time, and 
final failure mode of each potential failure mode of 
the palm olein case study is described in Table 3. 
 
In the qualitative approach, only two factors are 
assigned to each potential failure mode: the severity 
and occurrence. These two factors are indicated by 
the Criticality Priority Number (CPN). The severity 
description is related to the potential effect of the 
failure resulting from the potential failure mode of 
each process, whereas the occurrence description is 
related to the failure rate, which represents the 
number of failures expected to occur during the 
process. The assignment of the severity and 
 
Figure 1. Production process flow of palm olein 
 
Table 1. Severity classification and description 
Category Description Definition Conversion 
I Catastrophic A failure which may cause total loss of product (threaten the human life) 4 
II Critical 
A failure which may cause severe inefficiency and/or ineffectiveness in the 
reconstruction of product (change the taste, decrease the shelf life) 
3 
III Marginal 
A failure which may cause minor inefficiency and/or ineffectiveness in the 
reconstruction of product (reprocess) 
2 
IV Minor A failure which may be overcome with an unscheduled measure 1 
 
Table 2 .Occurrence classification and description 
Category Description Definition Conversion 
A Frequent 
A high probability of occurrence (equal to or greater than 0.03 of the overall 
probability of failure) 
5 
B 
Reasonably 
common 
A moderate probability of occurrence (more than 0.005, but less than 0.03).  4 
C Occasional An infrequent probability of occurrence (more than 0.0005, but less than 0.005) 3 
D Rare An unlikely probability of occurrence (more than 0.00005, but less than 0.0005) 2 
E Extremely rare A failure whose probability of occurrence is essentially zero (less than 0.00005) 1 
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occurrence categories is based on Tables 1 and 2, 
which have already been adjusted for the oil 
company case study. After assigning the severity and 
occurrence categories for each potential failure mode, 
they are converted to the corresponding CPN 
numbers. For instance, the potential failure mode 
„mesh is already full of residue‟ has a severity 
category of III, which means the potential failure 
effect that much oil is stopped by the mesh is a 
marginal failure, that is, a failure that may cause 
minor inefficiency and/or ineffectiveness in the 
reconstruction of product, and may require time for 
reprocessing. For the same potential failure mode 
„mesh is already full of residue‟ the occurrence 
category is C, which indicates an occasional failure 
with an infrequent probability of occurrence and a 
failure rate more than 0.0005 but less than 0.005 per 
million hours. Then, severity category III converts to 
a CPN of 2, while occurrence category C converts to a 
CPN of 3, and the average of the two yields a CPN of 
2.5. 
 
After obtaining the CPN values for every potential 
failure mode, they are ranked from smallest to 
largest CPN to determine which potential failure 
modes should be prioritized for taking action. The 
smallest CPN value means the potential failure 
mode has the least importance, while largest 
number means the potential failure mode has the 
most importance. Table 3 shows the priority of each 
potential failure mode from the most to the least 
important for the palm olein case study. It provides 
information regarding which potential failure modes 
should be prioritized for taking action, with the most 
important being „chemical not in appropriate 
amount‟ and the least important being „mesh is 
already full of residue.‟ 
 
Recommended actions 
 
This section will discuss some recommended actions 
for reducing the probability of occurrence of the 
failure modes explained on FMEA description. The 
recommended actions have been proposed and 
discussed with the company‟s process engineer 
because the actions should be applicable to the 
production process of making palm olein. As 
example, the potential failure modes „mesh is 
already full of residue‟ might be anticipated by 
scheduling the appropriate times to replace the mesh 
and add intermediary process. The Mean Time 
between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time to Repair 
(MTTR) are helpful time calculations as the inputs to 
find the appropriate interval for replacing the mesh. 
In the palm olein case study, the MTBF can be 
calculated as the average time between failures 
(mesh is full of residue) of a system, while the MTTR 
represents the average time required by a technician 
to repair a failed component or device, that is, to 
replace the mesh. Besides that, add pressing as 
intermediary process may decrease the number of oil 
stopped by the mesh. Therefore, yield of palm olein 
can also increase. Regarding to those actions effort, 
the MTBF and MTTR calculation don‟t need a big 
effort, because it could be done by the maintenance 
department, then apply it on the filtrating process. 
Meanwhile about the additional pressing process, it 
should make an investment on new machine and of 
course, the worker to operate that machine and its 
maintenance system. 
 
It is proposed that the recommended actions be 
taken based on the prioritization already made 
because the highest CPN indicates the potential 
failure mode that is most likely to have a large effect 
and that should thus be addressed as soon as 
possible to prevent it becoming more severe and 
frequent. The recommended actions that have 
already been proposed will also be evaluated by 
assigning the CPN of their corresponding potential 
failure modes. The CPN is based on the severity and 
occurrence factors as explained on CA description, 
which includes the procedure for assigning the 
severity and occurrence categories and their 
conversion into CPN values based on Table 1 and 2. 
There are some reasons for assigning the severity 
and occurrence categories for the recommended 
actions. For instance, the potential failure mode 
„chemical substance is not of the appropriate 
quantity‟ might be anticipated by finding the 
appropriate quantity of chemical substance. Design 
of Experiment (DoE) is one way to deal with that 
action. This recommended action is assigned a 
severity category of III and occurrence category of C 
because chemical substance is very sensitive. It 
means that a little change of it, then the result will 
be different in total.  Table 3 shows the failure IDs of 
the potential failure modes and the associated 
recommended actions followed by the severity and 
occurrence categories and the CPNs assigned to 
them.  
 
Comparison of the process before and after 
improvement 
 
After gathering CPN data before and after the 
improvement, the next step is making a comparison 
between the two conditions to determine whether 
there is a change in conditions after the improve-
ment. Figure 2 shows the CPN before and after the 
improvement for the palm olein case study. The 
numbers shown on the bar chart are the average 
CPN obtained from the severity and occurrence 
categories. A statistical two-sample t-test was used 
to check whether the value after improvement is 
significantly better than the value before improve-
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ment. The result of the two-sample t-test is the 
rejecting the null hypothesis with a P-value of 0.000, 
less than α-risk (0.05). This result indicates that the 
mean of the CPN before improvement is significantly 
greater than mean of the CPN after improvement, 
or, in the other words, the recommended actions of 
the proposed improvement result in a significantly 
lower CPN compared to the value before improve-
ment. The result shows there is a lower severity 
category and probability of repeating the same 
failure modes. 
 
FMECA and criticality matrix 
 
Information regarding the process, sub-processes, 
descriptions or functions of its processes or sub-
processes, potential failure modes, potential effects of 
failures, failure IDs, criticality analysis (both the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches), CPN 
values and ranks, as well as the recommended 
actions, the qualitative approach of the criticality 
analysis and CPN values of the recommended 
actions are the inputs to the Failure Mode Effects 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Table 3 is the 
FMECA of palm olein case study. 
 
After the FMECA is built, the next step is building 
the criticality matrix. In this matrix, the criticality 
analysis with the qualitative approach is the input, 
which consists of the severity and occurrence 
categories. The x-axis depicts the severity classifica-
tion with four categories (I to IV), and the y-axis 
depicts the occurrence classification with five cate-
gories (A to E). The criticality matrix includes the 
Table 3. FMECA on palm olein case study 
FMEA Analysis 
Failure 
ID 
Process Sub Process Description/Function Potential Failure Mode 
Potential Effect(s) 
of Failure 
1.10 
Refinery 
Bleaching 
Purifying the oil colour 
(from red-orange to 
clear) 
Chemical substance is 
not of the appropriate 
quantity 
Too much: it affects 
the oil taste 
Too little: the oil 
colour is still red-
orange like crude 
palm olein 
1.20 Filtrating 
Filtrating the residue 
from the bleaching 
process 
Mesh is already full of 
residue 
Much oil is stopped 
by the mesh 
1.30 Deodorizing 
Relieving the oil odour 
and moisture levels 
Deodorizing material is 
not of the appropriate 
quantity 
Too little: 
deterioration of oil 
Too much: the 
deodorizing 
material will be 
tasted 
2.10 Storing  
Store oil in the bottle, 
keep away from light 
and airflow 
Bottles placed carelessly 
Early oxidation can 
occur 
CA Analysis 
Failure 
ID 
FEP (β) FMR (α) FR (λp) OT (t) FM (Cm) SB OB CB Rank Recommended actions SA OA CA 
1.10 
0.004 
0.29 3.00E-08 28800 0.000337 II A 4 1 
Finding the appropriate 
quantity of chemical 
substance by doing 
Design of Experiment 
(DoE) 
III C 2.5 
0.996 
1.20 1 0.22 4.25E-10 28800 3.96E-06 III C 2.5 4 
Scheduling the 
appropriate time to 
replace the mesh (adopt 
MTBF and MTTR) and 
add pressing process 
IV D 1.5 
1.30 
0.571 
0.39 2.00E-08 28800 0.000225 II B 3.5 2 
Finding the appropriate 
quantity of deodorizing 
material by doing Design 
of Experiment (DoE) 
III D 2 
0.429 
2.10 1 1 1.25E-09 28800 0.000036 II C 3 3 
Provide a suitable place 
and increase operator's 
awareness 
III D 2 
FEP: Failure Effect Probability;  FMR: Failure Mode Ratio; FR: Failure Rate; OT: Operating Time; FM: Failure Mode; SB: 
Severity Before improvement; OB: Occurrence Before improvement; CB: Criticality priority number Before improvement; 
SA: Severity After improvement; OA: Occurrence After improvement; CA: Criticality priority number After improvement 
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failure ID both before improvement (bottom-left) and 
after improvement (top-right), so it can show the 
change between the two conditions. Each failure ID, 
which represents a potential failure mode, will be 
depicted based on its severity and occurrence 
categories already determined as in Table 3. The 
criticality matrix is depicted on Fig. 3. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has used a concise and clear methodology 
for applying the Failure Mode Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) approach to processes of an oil 
company. This approach begins with direct obser-
vation of the production process for palm olein, then 
maps their process flows. Next, a FMECA is per-
formed that describes the details of the critical 
processes and includes a criticality analysis for each. 
Recommended actions are proposed to reduce the 
criticality risk. The recommended actions are eva-
luated by performing a criticality analysis after the 
improvements and comparing the results with those 
of the analysis performed before the improvements. 
The recommended actions give significantly better 
results compare with conditions before the impro-
vement. The result is related to a safety improve-
ment, which refers to a decreased severity category 
and probability of occurrence of the same failure 
mode. The criticality priority number improved by 
38.46% (average CPN from 3.25 to 2) for the palm 
olein case study. 
As explained above, this study has succeeded in 
applying FMECA to an oil company case study. 
However, FMECA is a tool that can be applied not 
only to an oil company but also to other another 
fields, and it could be used before the design stage 
commences to influence the design and uncover 
design risks. FMECA can be applied in electricity 
component design, the food industry, the automotive 
industry, and even for the daily needs industry 
related to customer satisfaction. 
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